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  On July 10, 2001, a jury sitting in New York concluded that it was incapable of reaching a unanimous 
verdict for a life or death sentence, and it understood, consequently, that the defendant Khalfan Khamis 
Mohamed would be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for his role in the bombing of the 
United States Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. [FN1]  Eleven of the jurors indicated that they 
found as a mitigating circumstance that “[o]thers of equal or greater culpability in the murders [would] 
not be sentenced to death.” [FN2]  The jurors had been told that they could consider, as a mitigating 
factor, that the “highest Court of the Republic of South Africa, overruling a lower court decision, held 
that Khalfan Khamis Mohamed should not have been released to American authorities . . . without 
obtaining an agreement from the United States that he would not face the death penalty in the United 
States.” [FN3]  The jury was also informed that four others charged in the bombing who either had been 
or were going to be extradited from Germany and Great Britain would, as a term of their extradition, not 
face the death penalty. [FN4] 
 
  The verdict in Mohamed’s case represents perhaps the most significant domestic response yet to the 
consensus among the courts of democracies that American capital justice offends core *162 notions of 
human dignity. [FN5]  Gregg v. Georgia [FN6] notwithstanding, the United States Government has been 
unable to persuade the court of any abolitionist state that the American brand of capital justice is 
sufficiently accurate and fair to justify extradition without an assurance that the death penalty will not be 
sought. [FN7]  As the United States seeks to extradite suspected terrorists for trial purposes in this 
country, the same pattern emerges: the regime of capital punishment to which we appear addicted strikes 
the rest of the democratic world as an affront to human dignity. [FN8] 
 
  I The Extradition Cases 
 
  Most countries that deny extradition to the United States in potentially capital cases do so based upon 
their understanding of treaty commitments or other international obligations, as well as their domestic 
response to capital punishment.  Occasionally, *163 however, an extradition question presents itself in a 
form that requires courts to assess whether or not the act of surrendering an individual to American-style 
capital punishment violates rights embedded in their domestic charters or constitutions.  The two most 
prominent of these decisions proceed on rather different theories.  The European Court of Human Rights 
held that the experience of being on death row itself violates Article 3 of the Convention for the 
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Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms that prohibits torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment. [FN9]  In contrast, the Canadian Supreme Court [FN10] concluded that it was the 
administration of capital punishment itself, and not simply the extended incarceration preceding it, that 
required its respective governments to refuse to extradite those charged with capital crimes to the United 
States absent an assurance that the death penalty would not be sought in all but exceptional cases. 
 
  In Soering v. United Kingdom, [FN11] the European Court of Human Rights, focused on what has 
become known as the “death row phenomenon” in concluding that extradition to the United States, 
without assurances that Virginia would not seek the death penalty, violated Article 3 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights prohibiting “inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment.”  In the 
Court’s view, the predictable extended stay on death row, when combined with the defendant’s youth 
and mental condition, constituted a violation of Article 3 even if the death penalty per se did not. [FN12] 
 
  The Supreme Court of Canada focused on the inevitability of error.  In doing so, it reversed its then 
ten-year-old ruling in Kindler v. Crosbie [FN13] upholding the discretion of the minister to extradite 
without assurances. [FN14]  In United States v. Burns, the *164 Supreme Court of Canada described the 
basis for the change as follows:  
The outcome of this appeal turns on an appreciation of the principles of fundamental 
justice, which in turn are derived from the basic tenets of our legal system.  These basic 
tenets have not changed since 1991 when Kindler and Ng were decided, but their 
application in particular cases (the “balancing process”) must take note of factual 
developments in Canada and in relevant foreign jurisdictions.  When principles of 
fundamental justice as established and understood in Canada are applied to these factual 
developments, many of which are of far-reaching importance in death penalty cases, a 
balance which tilted in favor of extradition without assurances in Kindler and Ng now 
tilts against the constitutionality of such an outcome. [FN15] 
 
  The first paragraph of its opinion makes clear exactly the developments the Court had in mind:  
Legal systems have to live with the possibility of error.  The unique feature of capital 
punishment is that it puts beyond recall the possibility of correction.  In recent years, 
aided by the advances in the forensic sciences, including DNA testing, the courts and 
governments in this country and elsewhere have come to acknowledge a number of 
instances of wrongful convictions for murder despite all of the careful safeguards put in 
place for the protection of the innocent. . . . Other countries have also experienced 
revelations of wrongful convictions, including states of the United States where the death 
penalty is still imposed and carried into execution. [FN16] 
 
  The results in these cases owe a great deal to the legal struggle in the United States concerning capital 
punishment.  Our willingness to tolerate extended stays on death row is the very basis for the European 
Community’s refusal to extradite.  While American courts seem prepared to attribute the “death row” 
phenomenon to the defendant’s understandable challenges to a death sentence, [FN17] foreign observers 
identify any extended wait for execution *165 as problematic regardless of its source. [FN18] 
 
  Defendants may be responsible for insisting that their claims be heard, but they play no role in how 
long it takes courts to decide those claims nor how eager prosecutors are to insist upon a rapid resolution 
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of collateral proceedings.  We are, of course, not alone in taking our time before executing an individual. 
[FN19]  We appear to be alone in refusing to acknowledge that the state has an obligation to resolve a 
condemned prisoner’s appeals in a reasonably expeditious fashion. [FN20] 
 
  The innocence concern is not ours alone, either.  The Canadian Supreme Court in Burns pointed to 
Canadian cases first in arriving at its ultimate conclusion that, except in extraordinary cases, extradition 
without assurances was a violation of the requirement of fundamental justice embedded in section 7 of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. [FN21]  The Court emphasized:  
The possibility of miscarriages of justice in murder cases has long been recognized as a 
legitimate objection to the death penalty, but our state of knowledge of the scope of this 
potential problem has grown to unanticipated and unprecedented proportions in [the past 
ten years].  This expanding awareness compels increased recognition of the fact that the 
extradition decision of a Canadian Minister could pave the way, however unintentionally, 
to sending an innocent individual to his or her death in a foreign jurisdiction. [FN22] 
 
  After discussing some Canadian cases in detail, the court turned to the American experience, one that it 
was required to paint with a far broader brush, given the frequency of the occurrence here. [FN23] 
 
  While the two rationales leading to a refusal to extradite--that *166 both the process employed by and 
the result of our capital punishment regime are at odds with core notions of human rights--have not 
commended themselves to American courts, [FN24] the extradition decisions deserve careful 
examination for a number of reasons.  First, they provide us with a mirror in which we can see reflected 
the image of our system of capital punishment. Given the natural (and appropriate) tendency of 
American lawyers and legal scholars working in capital punishment to narrow their focus to those issues 
that appear to interest our courts, these cases provide an important reminder that, for much of the 
democratic world, the fundamental moral questions surrounding capital punishment are also 
fundamental legal questions.  They also suggest that rational jurists, sensitive to the need for comity 
among nations, see a contradiction between a commitment to fundamental human rights and capital 
punishment. 
 
  *167 As the Supreme Court of the United States continues to undertake Eighth Amendment analysis 
under the rubric of evolving standards of human decency, [FN25] an emerging consensus among nations 
with mature legal systems that capital punishment offends basic norms of human rights may, at some 
future point, become a significant consideration in that analysis.  While the Court has treated the 
relevance of the views of other legal systems inconsistently, [FN26] the matter is hardly settled.  
Arguments that failed to move American courts in their original form, may yet, in the garb of the 
justifications driving judicial decisions by foreign courts, have an influence over the domestic legal 
debate about capital punishment. 
 
  Most significantly, perhaps, the extradition decisions represent judgments about our system of capital 
punishment based upon claims about our system that have not been presented in any depth to American 
courts.  The extradition cases have become the forum in which it is both feasible and appropriate to raise 
systemic attacks on the American system of capital justice.  It is premature to conclude that these 
challenges cannot ultimately prove persuasive here. [FN27]  It is worth remembering that the argument 
that prevailed in Furman v. Georgia [FN28] had never persuaded a single court and had been rejected 
when presented as a due *168 process rather than Eighth Amendment claim by the Supreme Court itself 
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two years earlier in McGautha v. California. [FN29]  Thus it is worth examining the extradition 
decisions to see what, if anything, they tell us about the future of American capital litigation. 
 
  II Differences Between Extradition and Domestic Cases 
 
  In order to see the potential reach of the extradition decisions, it is first necessary to consider the many 
differences between those cases and the typical domestic death penalty case.  The first distinction 
between cases like Burns and Soering and any domestic death penalty case is that the defendants in 
Burns and Soering were accused of crimes, but had not yet been convicted. [FN30] The typical 
defendant in a domestic capital case has already been found guilty of a capital murder and sentenced to 
death.  Whereas these foreign courts evaluate the fairness and accuracy of the United States’ capital 
justice system in the abstract, a domestic court, armed with the doctrine of harmless error, need only 
evaluate whether an individual defendant’s case was resolved in a manner that appears substantially 
correct.  The difference between a systemic attack in extradition cases and the same kind of attack in a 
domestic case becomes apparent when one considers McCleskey’s [FN31] claim that race operated as an 
unacknowledged aggravating circumstance in our system of capital punishment with Soering’s claim 
about the horrors of death row or Burns’ argument that guilt determination is unreliable. 
 
  McCleskey made a much more powerful showing that our system of capital justice offends core 
notions of human dignity than did either Soering or Burns.  Neither Soering’s claims about the effect of 
death row nor Burns’ assertions about inaccuracy flowed from evidence introduced in open court and 
subject to *169 cross-examination and counter-proofs.  While one might well believe in the accuracy of 
what Soering said about death row and Burns about inaccurate convictions, McCleskey was the one who 
presented the results of a rigorous social science investigation of the very criminal justice system which 
placed him on death row.  Despite the power of his demonstration that race is the unacknowledged 
“aggravating factor” that determines the result in many capital cases, McCleskey lost. 
 
  He lost for reasons that would simply not arise in an extradition case.  First, he could not satisfy any 
court, much less the Supreme Court, that racial considerations influenced the prosecutor’s decision to 
seek the death penalty or the jury’s decision to impose it.  Since Soering and Burns dealt with 
individuals not yet subjected to the infirmities that arguably characterize the United States’ justice 
system, the defendant needed only demonstrate the possibility that extradition would subject him to the 
system’s deficiencies.  Because the claim is hypothetical--the defendant has neither run the risk of false 
conviction or faced brutalization on death row--there are no facts particular to the defendant’s 
experience to temper the extradition court’s ability to arrive at sweeping conclusions about our capital 
punishment system. 
 
  Second, McCleskey lost because his evidence proved too much.  His data challenged the entire 
criminal justice system.  Given that there is no reason to suspect that race operates more perniciously in 
the relatively high profile area of capital cases, accepting McCleskey’s argument that race was an 
arbitrary factor affecting the disposition of capital cases would open Pandora’s box.  When it comes to 
the role of race, whatever might be demonstrated about capital punishment is also applicable (probably 
even more conclusively) to other types of punishment.  It is difficult to justify an approach that 
acknowledges and attempts to defeat racism for the most serious form of punishment while leaving it to 
fulminate for all others.  Justice Powell cast this point in terms of the essential and unavoidable role of 
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discretion in the criminal justice system.  He believed that acknowledging McCleskey’s argument would 
have repercussions throughout the criminal justice system. 
 
  The court would have to live with the consequences of acknowledging that racism pervades the 
criminal justice system, and the majority was unwilling to do so.  The decisions whether *170 to 
extradite do not carry comparable baggage.  Indeed, the issues on which the courts have focused are 
readily distinguishable from those encountered by criminal justice systems that do not embrace capital 
punishment.  The European Community has no death row.  The European Court of Human Rights can 
speculate about the horror of lengthy imprisonment while awaiting execution without the worry that the 
principles it adopts may have consequences for the cases of those imprisoned to a term of years within 
the European Union.  The Canadian Supreme Court can express genuine concern for the accuracy of 
criminal adjudication but limit the implications of that concern to the one situation in which error cannot 
be remedied: the executed defendant. 
 
  This is not to suggest that either of these courts would not have reacted similarly if their respective 
states embraced capital punishment; as to that, one can only speculate.  What it does suggest is that, 
unlike American courts confronting these arguments, the European Court of Human Rights and the 
Supreme Court of Canada needed to concern themselves with the implications of the decision for the 
relationship between sovereign states, but not the implications for their domestic criminal law. 
 
  The extradition decisions do not directly contradict a position taken by the United States Supreme 
Court. [FN32]  The arguments accepted by the decisions in Soering and Burns are arguments that have 
never been made to or resolved by the United States Supreme Court.  Contrast the bases upon which 
these courts relied--the death row effect and the inevitability of error--with the claim that our system 
works in a manner that favors white life over the life of people of color.  To choose this as a basis for a 
refusal to extradite would involve both an express rejection of the McCleskey decision that race did not 
operate unlawfully within our capital punishment system and would articulate a principle that might well 
have ramifications for Europe and Canada.  It would be an invitation to revisit the arbitrariness 
argument, one that has not commended itself to other courts as a basis for eliminating capital 
punishment. 
 
  In sum, the arguments embraced by the extradition cases are *171 arguments against capital 
punishment that have existed long before our current experiment with guided discretion.  It has always 
been true that capital punishment eliminates the possibility of correcting error and that there is a 
particular cruelty in awaiting one’s own death at the hands of the state.  The more modern arguments 
arising directly out of the American experience--e.g., race as an aggravating factor and the pervasive 
inadequacy of representation for poor people--were not the basis for the decision.  The institution of 
capital punishment, not our society’s treatment of the disadvantaged, received condemnation. 
 
  While these features of extradition cases may explain why domestic courts may chose to ignore them, 
one can suggest that these are the very features suggesting that American courts should pay attention to 
them.  Since Zant v. Stephens [FN33] in 1983 and McCleskey in 1987, systemic attacks on the 
institution of capital punishment have disappeared from capital punishment litigation. [FN34]  We have 
come to accept a world of standardless capital decision-making in which race is an aggravating factor.  
Much more energy goes into demonstrating that individual defendants are poorly represented than into 
claims that the system as a whole risks affronting significant constitutional values. 
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  The extradition decisions remind us that there are systemic problems with capital punishment that the 
Supreme Court has yet to address, and that it may well be worth the effort to get American courts to 
confront those issues.  The extradition decisions may not figure in Justice Scalia’s calculus of the 
punishments that are both cruel and unusual, [FN35] but they are reasoned decisions of prestigious 
courts grappling with serious issues.  As such, they command notice and respect.  Indeed, Soering has 
already legitimized the argument that death row itself represents unacceptable punishment. 
 
  III The Death Row Effect 
 
  At least two Justices of the United States Supreme Court have encouraged the development of the 
argument that very lengthy incarceration on death row may itself be a violation of the Eighth *172 
Amendment. [FN36]  This is an argument that was presented to and ruled upon by the European Court 
of Human Rights before it had been presented to the United States Supreme Court. Indeed, pre-Soering 
mention of this argument is difficult to find.  When Justice Stevens, in Lackey v. Texas, called for 
further development of the “death row” argument, it was to decisions of the Privy Council (Jamaica) that 
he adverted. [FN37]  Of these cases, Soering involved a direct commentary on our practice as opposed 
to that of Jamaica. 
 
  Why should the first airing of the death row argument occur before the European Court of Human 
Rights as opposed, for instance, to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court?  A couple of reasons present 
themselves.  First, death row had started afresh in 1973 at the earliest so that the longest any person 
could have spent on the row as of 1989 was sixteen years.  This is hardly an insubstantial period of time, 
but it is not quite as long as the defendant in Lackey (seventeen years) or nearly as long as the defendant 
in Knight (twenty- four years). [FN38]  The more fundamental problem, however, resides in the nature 
of capital litigation and the wise advice to be careful what one prays for. 
 
  A basic principle of capital defense is that “where there is life, there is hope,” and it is tricky business 
to insist on the one hand that a defendant needs a full airing of all of his claims and on the other hand to 
suggest that if courts take too long in resolving those claims, the state loses the power to execute the 
defendant.  Moreover, any claim of extended delay raised by a prisoner subject to that delay would 
inevitably involve the reviewing court in the business of allocating blame for the delay.  While Justice 
Breyer certainly makes a powerful point in Knight that one cannot hold the accused responsible for 
delay resulting from errors made by the state which necessitate his retrial, cases in which the delay is 
overwhelmingly attributable to state error may be sufficiently rare that the doctrine, even if adopted, 
provides relief in relatively few cases. 
 
  The classic rationale for rejecting the claim was put forth by the Ninth Circuit in Richmond v. Lewis:  
*173 It would indeed be a mockery of justice if the delay incurred during the prosecution 
of claims that fail on the merits could itself accrue into a substantive claim to the very 
relief that had been sought and properly denied in the first place.  If that were the law, 
death-row inmates would be able to avoid their sentences simply by delaying proceedings 
beyond some threshold amount of time, while other death-row inmates--less successful in 
their attempts to delay--would be forced to face their sentences.  Such differential 
treatment would be far more “arbitrary and unfair” and “cruel and unusual” than the 
- 6 - 
 
current system of fulfilling sentences when the last in the line of appeals fails on the 
merits. [FN39] 
 
  The European Court of Human Rights was not confronted with the need to weigh these competing 
interests.  It had only to observe that people spent considerable time on death row prior to the final 
disposition of their case, and that death row was a terrible place to spend any extended incarceration. 
The holding has the virtue of providing a rationale against extradition without directly challenging the 
quality of American capital justice.  Whatever one might think of the reasoning of Soering, the fact of its 
existence has been of unquestioned importance. 
 
  As noted, Justice Breyer cited to Soering in his discussions of denial of certiorari in appeals brought by 
defendants raising the fact of lengthy incarceration while awaiting execution as an independent violation 
of the Constitution.  Although Justice Thomas wishes to declare the issue definitively resolved against 
the argument, [FN40] Florida has recognized a version of the argument when it held, in Jones v. State, 
that the twelve year delay in holding a hearing to determine whether the defendant had been competent 
to stand trial was a denial of due process. [FN41]  The Florida court quoted extensively from Justice 
Breyer’s dissent from the denial of certiorari in Elledge v. Florida, [FN42] in which Justice Breyer 
identified the need to respond to decisions such as Soering. [FN43]  Finally, in Burns, the Canadian 
Supreme Court could point to the dissents of both Justices Stevens and Breyer (both of which cited 
Soering) as indication of the vitality of the death row argument.  In Burns, this was combined with the 
observation of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Washington that the people who *174 had been 
executed in Washington were those who fundamentally “gave up” in their struggle against capital 
punishment. [FN44] 
 
  There are now two international precedents commenting upon our death row as well as numerous 
citations to Supreme Court dissents that support the proposition that life on death row is itself inhumane 
punishment.  While this is not the same thing as an affirmative ruling from an authoritative American 
court, the argument has far better support today than it did thirteen years ago when the European Court 
of Human Rights performed the high wire act of finding a ground for refusing to extradite without also 
concluding that capital punishment violated the European Convention. 
 
  IV The Inevitability of Error 
 
  The Supreme Court of the United States has never confronted the argument, standing alone, that the 
possibility of error in the determination of guilt or innocence represents an independent reason why 
capital punishment is unconstitutional. [FN45]  This may seem surprising given the logic of the Burns 
court’s position that a system which has an irreducible level of error built into it ought to be one which 
leaves open the possibility of correcting those errors.  Constitutional capital litigation, however, has not 
gone in this direction. 
 
  The litigation that led up to the Court’s decision in Furman was undertaken by lawyers from the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund as part of its campaign to address racial discrimination in America.  
Lawyers for the Fund developed a strategy designed to attack the institution of capital punishment on 
constitutional grounds.  The most prominent of these were the claims that capital punishment was 
racially discriminatory in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the standardless imposition of 
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the death penalty was in violation of the Fourteenth and, ultimately, *175 the Eighth Amendment. 
[FN46] 
 
  Given that the text of the Constitution contemplates capital punishment, litigation focused on the 
constitutional implications of who was being subjected to capital punishment and why, rather than the 
institution per se. These are the arguments to which the Court responded in Furman.  States then went 
about the business of crafting death penalty statutes in response to Furman, addressing the arbitrary 
nature of the process of selecting those who would die.  The accuracy of guilt determination had not 
been an issue and was not addressed by either the Court or the legislatures. 
 
  Legal activity in the post-Furman era of capital punishment has focused on whether the states’ various 
approaches solve the problem of creating a rational method for selecting among those whose crimes 
make them candidates for capital punishment.  There had been important voices pointing to the 
inaccuracy of the guilt determination process prior to the Furman era--Edwin Borchard [FN47] and 
Jerome Frank [FN48] being the most prominent--but the lawyers seeking to end capital punishment 
employed what appeared to be more immediately relevant legal tools.  Whether the Gregg statutes 
drained arbitrariness and racism from the system is debatable, but we can be certain that they did 
nothing about the problem of executing innocent people. 
 
  This argument that inaccuracy in guilt determination renders capital punishment constitutionally 
unacceptable is more compelling today than it would have been thirty years ago when the Court was 
struggling with McGautha, Furman, and Gregg.  There are at least two reasons for this.  First, the work 
of Bedau and Radelet [FN49] and then Scheck and Neufeld [FN50] has made apparent what has always 
been logically true--we mistakenly sentence people to death and execute them.  The Liebman studies 
[FN51] only confirm that error permeates capital sentencing.  Second, a prestigious *176 court--the 
Canadian Supreme Court--has analyzed the available data and concluded that the inevitability of error 
renders the institution of capital punishment inconsistent with fundamental human dignity. [FN52]  In so 
doing, it overturned its decision of a decade earlier in a unanimous opinion joined by the Chief Justice 
who had previously written the majority opinion coming to the contrary conclusion. [FN53]  While the 
Court’s opinion canvassed a broad range of issues, [FN54] the significant change between 1991 and 
2001 was the emerging data on erroneous convictions. 
 
  The Canadian Supreme Court undertook its analysis by considering cases from Canada, the United 
States, and the United Kingdom.  With respect to both the Canadian and U.K. experience, there were 
well known cases in which the provincial or national government took the formal position that errors 
had been made, errors that led to the execution of innocent people in the U.K. [FN55]  The American 
situation is, of course, more muddled, given federalism and the local nature of criminal prosecutions.  
The federal government has not concerned itself with injustice at either the local or federal level. 
 
  The Illinois moratorium is the most authoritative governmental acknowledgment of the problem, and 
that was undertaken by direction of the governor and not as a result of an official commission of inquiry. 
[FN56]  The thirteen cases of wrongful convictions occurring in Illinois since the 1970s considerably 
outnumber the cases identified in Canada and the U.K. combined.  The Canadian Supreme Court noted 
the moratorium as well as looking to the position of the ABA, the Justice Department report on the 
federal death penalty statute, and legislative action both in Nebraska *177 and New Hampshire. [FN57]  
The court concluded that this level of activity, combined with the more open acknowledgement of the 
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problem by the national governments of both Canada and the U.K., put it beyond dispute that neither 
human nature nor human institutions had evolved to the point of arriving at error free decisions 
concerning criminal guilt in capital cases. [FN58]  From this conclusion, it was but a short step to the 
conclusion that extraditing a defendant to a legal system employing capital punishment was denying that 
extradited person the fundamental justice called for by the Canadian Charter. 
 
  Can the same argument be made here?  Are we at the point of acknowledging that the execution of 
innocents has and will continue to occur, and if so, does it necessarily follow that capital punishment 
violates our constitution?  As to the factual question of whether our system systematically risks the 
execution of the innocent, the answer is yes.  Everything we know about how the innocent are convicted 
suggests that this will happen more often in a capital case than in the typical criminal case. [FN59] 
 
  Virtually everyone on death row is there as a result of trial rather than plea.  Whatever comfort one 
might draw as to accuracy from the defendant’s admission of guilt in open court [FN60] is simply not 
available in the overwhelming majority of capital cases.  In comparison with the general population of 
murderers, those defendants sentenced to death were more likely convicted for killing a stranger.  The 
crimes that land people on death row are also more likely to involve some form of barbarity than the 
average murder. Heinousness is, after all, a ubiquitous aggravating circumstance. 
 
  Barbarous crimes scream out for solution, and both investigators and prosecutors are under pressure to 
identify, charge, and convict those whose crimes appear monstrous.  In many cases, the state is forced to 
rely upon uncertain eye witness identification and statements of intimates who claim the defendant 
admitted guilt.  Sometimes testimony based on what is now recognized as “junk science” supplements 
this dubious evidence. 
 
  *178 By definition, the fact-finder can ignore unreasonable doubts in arriving at the conclusion that the 
defendant is guilty.  As much as courts oppose the notion that one ought to assign a percentage to the 
reasonable doubt standard, even if we believe that juries ought to be ninety-five percent certain before 
convicting and we believe that juries actually achieve this level of certainty, there is still a five percent 
margin of doubt.  If ninety- five percent certainty translates into ninety-five percent accuracy, then in 
five percent of the cases the unreasonable doubt is accurate. 
 
  Indeed, it is difficult to see how a system that considers ninety-five percent certainty to be sufficient to 
convict could possibly achieve 100% accuracy.  This would only be true if one believed that everyone 
charged with a capital crime is guilty so that every conviction is accurate and every acquittal inaccurate.  
Given the pressure to “solve” capital cases, there is little reason to suppose that prosecutors are more 
demanding of strong proof before they bring such cases than they are in the normal criminal case.  This 
is particularly true in those counties that strive to turn every homicide into a capital case. 
 
  Would American courts be receptive to an argument that capital punishment demands a level of 
accuracy that we cannot achieve?  One has already found that the inevitability of error renders capital 
punishment unconstitutional. [FN61]  To the extent that the Eighth Amendment analysis includes an 
inquiry into the penal justification for the practice, executing the innocent weighs heavily against the 
view that capital punishment resonates with evolving standards of decency. 
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  There is no moral view of capital punishment that would justify executing an innocent person.  There 
may be an instrumental argument that would justify executing the innocent as a price that needed to be 
paid to achieve the greater good of executing the guilty, but this argument assumes that executing the 
guilty increases utility.  A utilitarian justification would have to proceed along the line that the 
institution of capital punishment saves so many lives that it justifies the occasional life taken in error as 
well as the costs associated with the public recognition that this occurs.  Yet, there is no persuasive 
demonstration that capital punishment saves any lives, [FN62] much less enough lives to counterbalance 
the cost of the state taking life in error. 
 
  *179 The problem here is not doctrinal. [FN63]  In re Winship [FN64] tells us that the consequences of 
a judicial determination of fact dictate how convincing the proof of that fact must be.  Because the 
consequence of a criminal conviction can be so dire, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required in 
criminal cases even though we assume that it permits some guilty to go free.  Since capital punishment 
represents a qualitative difference in the severity of the state’s response to crime, at a minimum we 
ought to eliminate all doubts, not just reasonable ones, before taking life. [FN65]  Appellate courts, 
reviewing capital cases, would be required to pass on the question of whether the evidence justified the 
jury in achieving absolute certainty as to guilt.  This would be a challenge, given the view that 
credibility is a question for the jury. 
 
  This is not a suggestion that the Court simply overturn Franklin v. Lynaugh, which held that a capital 
defendant did not have an Eighth Amendment right to a residual doubt instruction, and require states to 
allow arguments about residual doubt as a mitigating factor. [FN66]  Rather, consistent with the notion 
that we value life even more than liberty, the argument is that the criterion for taking life must be 
absolute certainty that the defendant committed the murder. [FN67] 
 
  There is something a bit odd about a system that finds a Constitutional mandate that we employ special 
proceedings to determine whether a guilty person should be executed but demands nothing out of the 
ordinary in terms of assuring ourselves that the person is in fact guilty.  Whether or not this made sense 
when it was common currency that only the guilty were convicted, it does not make sense today.  This is 
particularly the case when one realizes that despite the courts’ attempt to create a jurisprudence of death 
worthiness, where one commits a murder is a far *180 greater predictor of whether the defendant will 
receive death than any particular feature of the crime.  And this “where” is county specific--what is a 
capital crime in Philadelphia is not in Pittsburgh; what is a capital crime in Houston is not in Dallas. 
[FN68]  In some counties there is little pretense of careful selectivity and therefore no argument that all 
of the possibly innocent have been effectively saved from a possible death sentence. 
 
  Can an absolute certainty standard be developed and administered?  Since we have outlawed torture as 
a method of juridical proof, [FN69] we have no method of even creating the appearance of absolute 
certainty since we cannot force the defendant to tell us that he committed the crime.  We can attempt to 
achieve perfect accuracy by insisting that the jury be told that it must be absolutely certain before 
sentencing a defendant to death, but we have ample reason to doubt that insisting upon perfect accuracy 
will in fact produce it. 
 
  The history of the law of homicide is one of the eventual dilution of standards developed in the hope 
that it would limit capital punishment to only the most appropriate cases.  This was the fate of the 
premeditation and deliberation formula [FN70] and it is certainly the fate of the aggravated- 
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circumstances regime identified in Gregg.  We know from a series of psychological studies, not to 
mention human experience, that we are capable of being absolutely certain about something that is not 
true.  The DNA exoneration cases teach that there is nothing apparent at the time of conviction that 
differentiates the cases of those who are in fact innocent from the cases of those who are guilty.  We 
simply cannot know for certain.  The correct response to this irreducible uncertainty is to put the 
sanction of death aside. 
 
  There is the difficulty that “[w]e still have no proven instance, not one, of a mistaken execution during 
the modern era of American capital punishment.” [FN71]  Time will solve this difficulty, *181 assuming 
that it is one.  There is nothing about the modern era that distinguishes it from the pre-Furman era when 
it comes to the question of guilt or innocence. 
 
  It is difficult to believe that we have achieved 100% accuracy in the 313 executions over the last 
twenty-five or so years, even though no jury was ever asked to do more than put aside reasonable (as 
opposed to all) doubt in arriving at guilt.  The jury research suggests that jurors who entertain residual 
(as opposed to reasonable) doubts about guilt are more likely to vote for life than other jurors, but this is 
not a claim that every juror who has any doubt then votes for life. [FN72]  Even if it were, this assumes 
that the cases in which jurors entertain doubt include all the cases in which, as it turns out, doubt is 
appropriate. 
 
  If the argument has a chance, one might ask, why has it not been raised earlier in domestic capital 
litigation?  Many reasons suggest themselves.  One might assume that the argument had been made and 
rejected thirty years ago. The disappearance of federally funded Resource Centers has robbed capital 
litigation in many states of an indispensable source of large ideas that ought to be raised in every capital 
case. 
 
  The claim that capital punishment is unconstitutional because our system inevitably errs is one that 
needs to be made pre-trial [FN73] and repeated when the issues of instructions to the jury arises.  Once 
the defendant has been convicted, the argument is very hard to raise for the first time.  This is because of 
the effect of waiver rules, and because a court’s natural response will be to consider the possible 
innocence of the defendant rather than possible errors in the system.  While it will be useful to remind 
the court that virtually none of the courts hearing appeals in the DNA exoneration cases expressed any 
concern about the reliability *182 of the verdict, [FN74] nonetheless it may be expecting too much of an 
appellate court to consider an “inevitability of error” argument that had not been properly preserved 
below. 
 
  The Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in Burns suggests that the inevitability of error remains one of 
the most powerful arguments against capital punishment.  Rather than centering the issue of whether we 
should have capital punishment on problems inherent in a multi-racial society in which criminal justice 
is administered on the local level, there is much to be said for returning, as the Burns court did, to an 
argument about capital punishment that is as old as the institution itself.  More than one-hundred and 
fifty years ago, a report to the Massachusetts legislature urging a ban on capital punishment noted that 
the institution:  
[C]auses the death of the innocent.  Centuries ago, when human life was regarded of little 
value, it was laid down as a maxim, that it were better ten guilty should escape than that 
one innocent should be punished. Now, we carry with us universal assent, when we 
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affirm that it were better that a hundred guilty should escape than that one innocent man 
should die. But it is not necessary to allow one to escape.  Substitute, for death, 
imprisonment, and, the suffering being reparable, there is infinitely less objection to its 
infliction, lest the innocent should suffer. [FN75] 
 
  More than a century and one half after these words were written, a prestigious court, after rigorous 
review of the available data, has acknowledged the power of this argument.  The inevitability of 
executing the innocent offends fundamental notions of human dignity.  Capital punishment should end. 
 
 
[FNa1]. Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law.  The author wishes to acknowledge 
the extremely valuable research assistance provided by Jennifer Barmon and Jason Benzaken, both 
members of the Northeastern Law School Class of 2003. 
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